Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1980

Utah State Tax Commission v. Parson asphalt
Products, Inc. : Brief of Defendant-Appellant Utah
State Tax Commission
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
ROBERT B. HANSEN; Attorney for Appellant;LaVar E. Stark; Attorney for Respndent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Parson Asphalt v. Utah Tax Comm'n, No. 16797 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2017

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF:

)
)

Parson Asphalt Products, Inc.
regarding special fuel tax
liability for the years of
October 1973 to September
1976, before the Utah State
· Tax Commission

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 16797

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION

Review of a Decision
of the
Second Judicial· District Court
Weber County
The Honorable John F. Wahlquist, Presiding

ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
MARK K. BUCH!
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Telephone: 801-533-5261
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
LaVar E. Stark
Attorney at Law
2651 Washington Blvd.
Suite No. 10
Ogden, UT 84401
Telephone: 801-393-8688
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent

FEB l 119GO
....,.,............

~·---

Clar!,

... -....... ~ -- ... ~-

f.')u:;:m~m.;

·-- ·:;.;,:;d. r . .,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

IN THE MATTER OF:

)

Parson Asphalt Products, Inc.
regarding special fuel tax
liability for the years of
Octob~r 1973 to September
1976, before the Utah State
Tax Commission

)
)
)
)
)
)

STAT~

OF UTAH

)

Case No. 16797

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION

Review of a Decision
of the
Second Judicial· District Court
Weber County
The Honorable John F. Wahlquist, Presiding

ROBERT B . HANSEN
Attorney General
MARK K. BUCHI
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Telephone: 801-533-5261
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
LaVar E. Stark
Attorney at Law
2651 Washington Blvd.
Suite No. 10
Ogden, UT 84401
Telephone: 801-393-8688
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CASES CITED

ii

STATUTES CITED

ii

SECONDARY-SOURCES CITED

ii

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

-1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

ARGUMENT

4

POINT I:
THE SCOPE OF THE EXEMPTION FROM
TAXATION ON THEUSE OF SPECIAL FUEL DOES
NOT EXTEND TO PARSON IN THE INSTANT CONTROVERSY
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
POINT II:
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT
THE ROADWAY IN QUESTION WAS A TOTALLY
NEW ROAD IS IN DIRECT CONTRAVENTION OF
THE STIPULATION OF FACTS GOVERNING
THIS CASE

4

10

12

CONCLUSION

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-

i

-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Capps v. Capps, 110 Utah 468, 175 P.2d 470
In Re Simpson's Estate, 43 Cal.2d 594
275 P.2d 467 (1954)

. ... . . .

12

. . . . .

5

Jensen v. Howell, 75 Utah 64, 282 P. 1034

12

Jewell v. Horner, 12 Utah 2d 328, 366 P.2d
594 (1961

12

. . .. . . . . .

Parker v. Quinn, 23 Utah 332, 64 P. 961 (1901)

5

STATUTES CITED
·utah Code Ann.

§27-12-2 (8)

7,9

Utah Code Ann.

§27-12-43.1(7)

Utah Code Ann.

§27-12-56 (b)

Utah Code Ann.

§41-ll-40(c)

Utah Code Ann.

§41-ll-49(a)

Utah Code Ann.

§41-ll-49(c)

Utah Code Ann.

§41-11-50

Utah Code Ann.

§41-11-50(1)

Utah Code Ann.

§59-24-1

. .

3,7

. . . .

3
8

. . . .

6,13

:::

..
•:1·

7

. . . .

1,5,
6,13
4,7

3

SECONDARY SOURCES CITED
71 Am.Jur.2d, State and Local Taxation,
§326 (1973)
.

. .. .

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
ii
Machine-generated OCR,- may
contain errors.

7

...

O~

IN THE SUPREME COURT

IN THE MATTER OF:
Parson Asphalt Products, Inc.
regarding special fuel tax
liability for the years of
October 1973 to September
1976, before the Utah State
Tax Cornrnis-sion

THE STATE OF UTAH

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No._16797

)

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the Second District Court's
decision which set aside the order of the Utah State Tax Commission which had required the respondent to pay the special fuel
tax for and during the reconstruction of the road to Antelope
Island.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Second District Court, sitting as the tax court,
found that the fuel used by Plaintiff-Respondent (hereafter,
Respondent) in the reconstruction of State Highway 127 from
October 1, 1973 through September 30, 1976 was exempt from the
special fuel tax under Utah Code Ann.

(1953)

§41-11-50.

Pursuant

to such a finding, the court set aside the Tax Commission's
decision and order.which had required Respondent to pay the
special fuel tax assessment made by the Tax Commission's staff.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the trial court's decision
and a reinstatement of the Tax

Corru~ission

decision which imposed

the special fuel tax on the fuel consumed in the reconstruction
of State Road Number 127.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The case was tried on the following stipulated facts:
1.

Parson Asphalt Products, Incorporated, is a Utah

corporation duly
2.

~ualified

to do business in the State of Utah.

Upon submitting the low bid for improving the quality

and reconstruction of a highway between Route 108 in Syracuse,
Utah and the north end of Antelope Island, known as State Highway
:~:

127, Plaintiff was awarded a contract by the State of Utah.
3.

An audit of the plaintiff's records discovered untaxed

purchases of "special fuel 11 consumed by the equipment of Parson
during the reconstruction of State Highway 127.

The Auditing

Division of the State Tax Commission found a User Special Fuel
Tax deficiency owned by plaintiff in the amount of $24,196.82
including interest and penalty for the period beginning October
1, 1973 through September 30, 1976.

The plaintiff does not con-

test the amount of the tax shown on the audit if it is found
not to be exempt from the tax.
4.

The Utah legislature designated and dedicated the

road beginning at Route 108 in Syracuse, Utah, running easterly
to the north end of Antelope Island as Route 127, a state highway,
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in Utah Code Ann.

§27-12-56(b) in 1965 and it has been contin-

uously designated as a state highway since 1965 by Utah Code
Ann .

§ 2 7-12- 4 3 . 1

5.

(7) .

Due to the severe conditions present on the Great Salt

Lake, Route 127 was periodically washed out,

ne~essitating

ex-

tensive reconstruction, repair and maintenance work to seek to·
maintain it ih a condition suitable for travel.
form of pictures taken in 1974 are

Exhibits in the

representati~e

of the highway during these periodic washouts.

of

t~e

condition

Parson's exhibit

No. 10 shows that contract and maintenance work.
6.

Since the designation of Route 127 as a state highway

in 1965, the highway has generally been suitable for passenger
car travel for six to eight month intervals.

In between those

six to eight month intervals, repair work would become necessary
to return the highway to a condition suitable for travel by
passenger automobiles.
7.

The "special fuel" upon which the taxes involved in

this proceeding were imposed was used in the operation of and/or
to propel motor vehicles and the only issue to be decided by the
court is whether the taxes were. properly imposed.
8.

This matter was heard by the State Tax Conunission on

July 29, 1977 and the Conunission decided that the use of the
plaintiff's vehicles was upon a public highway and denied the
plaintiff's claim for an exemption from the special fuel tax.
This appeal followed and proceeds under Utah Code Ann.

§59-24-1,

et seq, better known as the Tax Court Act.
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9.

In the performance of the contract the motor vehicles

used by Parson were non-licensed.
mission to use such equipment.

The state gave Parson per-

Parson claims that this equipment

was "off road" type and too large for highway use.
10.
Commission

The transcript of the proceedings had before the
on July 29, 1977 may be considered.

(R. 17, 18)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SCOPE OF THE EXEMPTION FROM TAXATION ON THE USE OF SPECIAL FUEL DOES
NOT EXTEND TO PARSON IN THE INSTAi."l\JT
CONTROVERSY.
Utah Code Ann.

§41-11-50(1), imposes a tax on the type

of fuel used by Parson in the reconstruction of State Highway
127 when it reads:
A tax is hereby imposed at the rate of
seven cents per gallon on the sale or use of
special fuel, provided that the sale or use of
special fuel for any purpose other than to operate
or propel a motor vehicle upon the public highways
of Utah shall be exempt from the application of
this tax.
The exemption as provided in this subsection
shall apply only in those cases where the purchasers
or the users of special fuel shall establish to the
satisfaction of the cormnission that the special fuel
purchased or used was used for purposes other than
to operate or propel a motor vehicle upon the
public highways of Utah.
This section imposes a tax on the use of all special fuel.
However, the legislature did provide a limited exemption from the
application of the tax.

As with all exemptions from taxation,

the exemption specified in §41-11-50(1) is to be strictly con-
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strued, since the release from the burden of such general statutes
must be clearly shown and will not be inferred from the doubtful
import of statutory language.

In Re Simpson's Estate, 43 Cal .. 2d

594, 275 P.2d 467 (1954); and 71 AI!l.Jur.2d State and Locai Taxation, §326.
Focusing on the exempt1ion given by the legislature, we.
find that use of the fuel for "any purpose other than to operate
or propel a motor vehicle upon the public highways of Utah" is
exempt.

The legislature further provided the scope of the exemp-

tion to be limited to "only .

.

. those cases where the purchasers

or the users of special fuel shall establish to the satisfaction
of the commission that the special fuel purchased or-used was
used for purposes other than to operate or propel a motor vehicle
upon the public highways of Utah."

(Emphasis added.)

The power to tax and the subject of taxation is constitutionally vested in th_e legislature and so is the power to exempt
from taxation.

The exemption must be clearly defined and founded

upon the plain language of the enactment which grants it, without
doubt or ambiguity and will not be aided by judicial interpretation.

71 Am.Jur.2d, State and Local Taxation, §326; see also,

Parker v. Quinn, 23 Utah 332, 64 P.961 (1901), to the same effect;
applying the rule to property tax exemptions.

By its own plain

terms, §41-11-50 states the exemption from the tax on special fuel
arises and exists "only in those cases" where the party seeking
exemption establishes a right to the exemption "to the satisfaction of the commission." . Stipulation of Facts, No. 8, states
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that Parson Asphalt Products did not qualify for the exemption
because the Commission found that the use of the special fuel
by Parson was not for

purpos~s

other than to operate or propel

a motor vehicle upon the public highways of Utah.
ing the above, Appellant

Notwithstand-

realizes that the Commission must act

reasonably and not arbitrarily or capriciously in carrying out
its duties under this statute.

The following discussion will

demonstrate that the Commission did not act arbitrarily, but
rather, in the only way the statutes governing the situation would
allow.
_Parson attempts to take advantage of the exemption by claiming that the vehicles used on the road which is the subject of the
audit were "off road" type vehicles and by claiming that the
v:ehicles were not used on a "public highway."

The first argument

is untenable as "road" vs. "off-road" use is immaterial to the
taxation issue due to the fact that the statute imposes the tax
on the use of special fuel to "operate or propel a motor vehicle."
Utah Code Ann.

§41-ll-49(a) defines the term "motor vehicle,"

as it is to be used in §41-11-50 as follows:
(a) Motor vehicle shall·mean and include
every self-propelled vehicle operated upon a
highway.
(Emphasis added.)
As all of the vehicles used by Parson which were the subject of the Tax Commission audit were

self-prop~lled,

the only

real issue to be resolved in the exemption decision is whether
the Parson vehicles were operated or propelled on the public
highways of Utah.
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Section 41-11-50(1) provides in· two separate paragraphs
that in order to obtain exemption, the parties must prove the use
to have been other than on the

11

public highways" of Utah.

The

term "public highways 11 is not defined in the motor fuels section,
but it is defined in the Highway Code; Utah Code Ann.

§27-12-2,

et seq. Section 27-12-2(8) prbvides:
11

Public Highway" means any road, street
alley, lane, court, place, viaduct, tunnel, culvert, or bridge laid out or erected as such by
the public, or dedicated or abandoned to the
public . . . ·.
(Emphasis added.)
•

Combined, §41-11-50(1) and §27-12-2(8) mandates, as a
matter of law, that the fuel consumed while operating a motor
vehicle upon the road to Antelope Island be subjected to the
special fuel tax.

·This follows since the legislature dedicated

this roadway as a public road in 1965 when it enacted Utah ·code
Ann.

§27-12-43.1 and created State Highway No. 127.
The above

sta~utory

provisions are fatal to any claim of

exemption under the terms of the Utah Use Fuel Tax Act of 1941.
This is reinforced when reference is made to Utah Code Ann.
§41-ll-49(c) which states:
Highway shall mean and include every way
or place, of whatever nature, generally open to
the use of the public for the purpose of vehicular
travel notwithstanding that the same may be temporarily closed for the purpos~ of construction,
reconstruction, maintenance or repair.
(Emphasis added.)
Applying these various principles to the facts, we find
that Parson operated self-propelled motor vehicles on a roadway
dedicated to public use which was periodically closed until
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necessary construction and repair work could be done to restore
the road to its normal passable condition.
Parson's arguments that its self-propelled motor vehicles ·
were of the off-road type, and were used on a road which woulo
become washed out and impassable for a four to six-month.period
each year are simply ineffective in seeking exemption under the
provisions of the Utah Code governing the audit situation.

Appel-

lant submits that this would be the case even if this court were
not under the obligation to strictly construe the statute which
Parson claims grants the exemption against such exemption.
_The best Parson could argue under these provisions is that
the dedicated public road, State Highway No. 127, became impassable for a four to six-month period thereby becoming closed to.
the use of the public during that period and thus ceased to be a
highway for purposes of the Utah Use Fuel Tax Act

of 1941.

This

argument fails to meet the test used by the courts in deciding
whether an exemption from taxation will be extended.
being

~

The test

plain, unambiguous, unmistakable language establishing
\

the exemption without the aid of judicial interpretation.

In

the instant controversy, there is simply no way to construe the
"non-highway" argument made by Parson as such a clear statement
by the legislature.

This follows when the accompanying text from

whence the argument comes is viewed.
abo~e,

Section 41-ll-40(c) cited

states that every way or place, of whatever nature, gener-

ally open to the .use of the public for vehicular travel is a
highway for purposes of the fuel act.

Appellant maintains that
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this is easily interpreted as an at~empt to envelope all types
of roads, even trails which have just been pioneered by hunters,
etc.

If the way or place is open to use by the public with

vehicles, it is a highway for purposes of this act.

The all in-

clusive intent is further manifested by the lan_guage "notwithstanding that the same may be' temporarily closed for the purpose
of construct1on, reconstruction, maintenance or repair."
entire provision seems directed at and

includin~ witni~

This
its coverage,

all places in Utah whereon a motor vehicle may be operated by the
public even if under construction or repair.
Likewise, the use of the term "public highway" in light
of its expansive definition as contained in §27-12-2(8), supra,
seems to indicate an intent to include roads which have merely
been dedicated to public use within the purview of this statute.
In summary, the road to Antelope Island was a public highway for purposes of Qtah Code Ann.
ing reasons:

§41-11-50(1) for the follow-

First, the roadway was dedicated to the public as

a state highway in 1965 (See U.C.A.

§27-12-2(8)).

Second, it

was erected and maintained as a roadway by the public for many
years prior to the commencement of work by Parson.

Finally, even

prior to the commencement of work by Parson, the road was generally open to public ·use as it was capable of travel by passenger
automobiles for a six to eight-month period each and every year.
Applying the statutes governing the instant controversy to the
above facts leads to the conclusion that the special fuel consumed
in rebuilding the highway. to Antelope Island was subject to taxa-
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tion. A fortiori, when all of the above is considered in light
of the fundamental legal principle that exemptions from taxation
are to be strictly construed with all doubts construed against
the one claiming exemption, there can be no other conclusion

r~ached 1

than that the assessment of the special fuel tax was lawfully proper as.mandated by the legislature of Utah.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE
ROADWAY IN QUESTION WAS A TOTALLY NEW
ROAD IS IN DIRECT CONTRAVENTION OF THE
STIPULATION OF FACTS GO\TERNING THIS

CASE.
In the trial court's Memorandum Decision, it was stated
that the new plan of constructing the roadway to Antelope Island
was so grossly different than the original plan, that a reasonable
mind cannot characterize it other than as the construction of a
totally new road (R.20).

In the Conclusions of Law section of

the trial court's Memorandum Decision, the court expands on this
finding by-stating that no reasonable mind could find other than
that the fuel used during the construction period was not used
upon the public roads.

The court continued by concluding that

State Highway No. 127 did not come into existence until it was
constructed by the Respondent contractor.
Such findings and conclusions are totally erroneous and
contradict the parties' Stipulation of Facts.

Paragraph 2 of the

stipulation reads:
Upon submitting the low bid for improvinq
and reconstruction of a highway between Route i,~g
in Syracuse, Utah and the north end of ~ntelope
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
- may
10contain
-- errors.
Machine-generated OCR,

Island, known as State Highway 127 Plaintiff
I
I
( Parson
s ) was awarded a contract
by
the State
of Utah." (Emphasis added.) (R.17)
Paragraph 3 states that the audit assessment was for "purchases of 'special fuel' consumed by the equipment of Parson
during the reconstruction of State Highway 127 . . - . .

11

(R.17)

Paragraphs 4 and 5 als;o take for granted that it was the
reconstruction, albeit major reconstruction, but reconstruction
nonetheless, of an existing public highway
the reconstruction as State Highway 127.

know~

(R.

before and after

17,18)

Testifying before the Tax Commission, Mr. Mark Wilson, a
Parson's engineer, stated that a supplemental agreement was entered
into between the state and Parson.

This supplemental agreement

provided for the repair of the existing road to a sufficient condi tiondi tion so that its equipment could travel from the mainland to the island (R.74,75).
The trial

cou~t's

Findings and Conclusions that Parson's

construction work on State Highway 127 was construction of a
'
"totally new road" flies in the face of the facts, both as they
existed and as stipulated.
This erroneously conclusion was apparently the trial
court's basis for reversing the Tax Commission in its finding of
taxability.

This is apparent when one reads the last two sen-

tneces of the trial court's decision.

They read:

The Court views this project factually,
and as a totally new right-of-way.
The ~ourt
therefore rules as a matter of law that it
follows that the fuel utilized in the construction is not taxable.
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Appellant submits that the case on appeal is one wherein
the trial court has rendered a decision which manifestly misapplied
the facts and made a finding clearly against the weight of the
evi'd ence. 1

As this is the case, appellant urges this court to

reverse the trial court and find that the special fuel consumed
in the reconstruction of State Highway 127 was fuel used to
operate or propel·a motor vehicle upon a public highway which
mandates the payment of the special fuel tax.
CONCLUSION
The scope of the exemption from taxation on the use of
speciai fuel is very narrow, and in the words of the statute
applies "only in those cases where the purchasers or the users of
special fuel shall establish to the satisfaction of the Commission
that the special fuel purchased or used was used for purposes other
than to operate or propel a motor vehicle upon the public highI

ways of Utah."

Both informal and formal hearings were had before

the Tax Commission where the Respondent fully presented its
views.

However, the Tax Commission was not convinced that the

use of the fuel was other than on the public highways and imposed
the special fuel tax.

As exemptions must be clearly defined and

will not be aided by judicial interpretation, the exemption simply
does not apply to Parson and the only inquiry should be whether
the Tax Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in so
finding that the special fuel was used on a public highway.
1

For cases t~1erein this court has been willincr to reverse the
lower court ~~ to it~ findinas of fact see J~well v. Horner,
12 Utah 2d 328, 366 P.2d 594 (1961) citing Jensen v. Ho~eli,
75
Utah
64,
282LawP.Library.
1034;
Capps
v. Capps,
Utah
468,
175 P.2d
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The Commission did not act arbitrarily as is demonstrated
by reference to the laws governing this case.

Section 41-11-50

imposes a tax on the sale or use of special fuel for the operation
and propelling of motor vehicles upon the public highways of Utah.
"Motor vehicle" is defined by §41-ll-49(a) as follows:
Motor vehicle shall mean and include every
self-p!opelled vehicle operated upon a highway. ·
Paragraph (c) of §49 defines "highway" as follows:
Highway shall mean and ihclude ev~ry way
or place, of whatever nature, generally open to the
use of the public for the purpose of vehicular
travel notwithstanding that the same may be temporarily closed for the purpose of construction,
reconstruction, maintenance or repair.
Thus, it can be seen that the scope of the exemption is very
narrow indeed as the word "highway" is very broadly defined as
"every way or place, of whatever nature."

It was further narrowed

by the definition of "highway" which states that such a highway

remains a highway notwithstanding that it was "temporarily closed
for the purpose of construction, reconstruction, maintenance
or repair.

11

The lower court's decision was based a conclusion that
the construction of State Highway 127 during the period
audit, was the construction of a totally new road.

of

this

This is

totally in contravention of the Stipulation of Facts and facts
as they existed, and this alone should be cause for reversal of
the lower court's decision because without that conclusion,
there is no basis for the decision.
Appellant respectfully requests this court to reverse
the trial court so that the special fuel tax may be imposed on
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the fuel consumed during and for the reconstruction of State
Highway 127 from Syracuse to Antelope Island.
DATED this 11th day

o~

February, 1980.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General

l/l/41;t}f(l 'U?!'it .

HARK K. BUCHI
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for DefendantAppellant
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I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing Brief of
Defendant-Appellant Utah State Tax Conunission were mailed, postage
prepaid, to LaVar E. Stark, Attorney at Law, 2651 Washington
Blvd., Suite No. 10, Ogden, Utah 84401, this 11th day of
February, 1980.
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